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***
In September, the O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law and the Foundation for
the National Institutes of Health (FNIH) convened 30 of the world’s leading authorities on global health
law, financing, biomedical science, implementation, and emergency response along with leaders from
prominent international organizations deeply engaged in responding to the pandemic. This meeting was
followed by regional consultations convened in Africa, Latin America-Caribbean, and Southeast Asia. The
O’Neill Institute/FNIH also held a consultation with civil society representatives. What follows is a
concise, edited excerpt from the full report, which may be downloaded at the following link:
https://oneill.law.georgetown.edu/publications/legal-tools-for-pandemic-preparedness-whocollaborating-center-support-for-new-coordinating-mechanisms/
***
The COVID-19 pandemic revealed the fractured and inadequate state of national and global
health law and institutions, revealing deeply embedded inequalities. The most important global health
preparedness and response accord—the International Health Regulations (IHR)—does not provide
incentives for investment in national capacities to prepare for, and respond to, infectious disease
threats. The IHR also does not govern fair and equitable access to medical innovations and
countermeasures.
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In an historic action earlier this year, 194 countries adopted a World Health Assembly (WHA)
resolution 1 to host a special session devoted solely to an international pandemic agreement, which will
take place on November 29. 2 The high-level experts who participated in our meetings after the
resolution was adopted had in-depth discussions on the weaknesses and persisting gaps in global
pandemic preparedness and what a new international agreement to address these voids might include.
Generally speaking, they thought the special session should explore several vehicles, including political
statements and resolutions, revision of the IHR, and an intergovernmental process to negotiate a new,
legally binding international agreement, achieved through the exercise of the World Health
Organization’s (WHO) constitutional authority. 3 None of these ideas preclude additional approaches,
such as negotiating “soft” or non-binding instruments, forming or improving global public-private
partnerships, or pursuing institutional modernization, including—and most importantly—strengthening
of the WHO. These may be achieved along parallel tracks of negotiation and may ultimately be realized
in combination.
Recommendations and Political Statements
Political statements have a useful signaling effect, but do not contain binding action
requirements. Many of our experts believe that political statements in isolation are unlikely to initiate
meaningful progress. One public health leader during our meetings demurred that he “gets paid to do,
not to talk.”
A Revised IHR
Article 21 of the WHO Constitution permits the WHA to “adopt regulations” concerning several
enumerated matters; the IHR is based on such constitutional authority and its reform and revision is a
viable possibility. It has already established broad areas of consensus for pandemic prevention and
response, and calls for its reform signal a commitment to find a way to make it operate more effectively.
On the other hand, the IHR is a product of its time. It was designed to balance international
travel and commerce with public health, and originally crafted prior to modern movements of people,
capital, and goods. While respecting human rights, the IHR may still not adequately keep pace with a
maturing international human rights regime. In fact, it could be argued that the IHR disincentivizes
reporting, given the collateral consequences to national economies. At the same time, the timing and
content of declaring Public Health Emergencies of International Concern have been highly
controversial. 4 Overall, closing these gaps in the IHR could improve pandemic preparedness, even if this
addresses only part of the problem.
A New Convention
In theory, an international pandemic treaty could address global governance failures in
comprehensive form. Under Article 19 of the WHO Constitution, the WHA “shall have authority to adopt
conventions or agreements with respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization.” So
far, the WHO has utilized this treaty-making power only once, in the Framework Convention on Tobacco
Control. An international instrument under Article 19 could initially establish broad areas for
coordination and regulation and leave detail to later protocols and guidelines. In short, a framework
convention-protocol strategy possesses a potential to achieve:
•

an all-of-government and all-of-society approach that facilitates the coordination and
participation of all relevant actors and stakeholders, including local communities;
2
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•
•
•
•

a One Health approach that facilitates information sharing and coordination of activities
between the human health, animal health, plant health, and environmental sectors;
domestic legal preparedness for public health emergencies through a continuous process
developing, reviewing, and updating laws, policies, and contingency plans;
addressing many facets of risk management from risk mitigation measures to post-pandemic
recovery; and
adopting the risk communication and community engagement (RCCE) approach to the delivery
of public health information, diagnostics, and treatments in the context of pandemics and
epidemics.

This potential is necessarily limited by national sovereignty, prioritization of activities, and
tailored responses fit to individual contexts.
A new international agreement will affect key aspects of human life governed by other treaties,
including the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea,
the Convention on Biological Diversity and its implementing Nagoya Protocol, human rights treaties, and
others. There is a growing view that digital sequencing information (DSI) and genetic sequencing data
(GSD), which are key to biodiversity management as well as pandemic preparedness, will be discussed in
the next meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity. In addition,
a new international agreement could touch upon the mandates of other intergovernmental
organizations from the WTO to UNICEF.
Several regional leaders who support an Article 19 agreement generally cautioned that effective
regional strategies should not be usurped by a one-size-fits-all approach. Common diseases will be
endured differently by different populations due to seasonality, health care capacity and other
resources, and variations in communities’ overall immune response to new pathogens.
Any instrument considered at the upcoming special session must have a dedicated team focused
on areas of overlapping authority. The IHR and the Nagoya Protocol, for example, have specific provisions
that contemplate additional or special international agreements, 5 and those provisions must guide
negotiations for a new pandemic instrument. What’s more, an already stretched WHO should not be
burdened with new tasks when other intergovernmental organizations are mandated, and better situated,
to deliver on their comparative advantages. However, strong coordination between UN agencies and
bodies is needed, and on global health, WHO should be in the lead. Importantly, any new international
instrument must be harmonized with existing legal obligations, including those under the IHR.
Drawbacks to Pursuing a New Convention
Unsurprisingly, the major drawback to this mechanism is its barrier to entry. There is an inverse
relationship between the rigor of substance and enforcement provisions and countries’ willingness to
accede without significant reservations, understandings, and declarations. WHA passage does not
preclude domestic ratification procedures. Treaties take time to negotiate, leave supportive private and
civil society sector partners at the periphery of discussions, and fall out of date. 6
Also, a framework convention approach would require countries to reach consensus on short,
definite timelines in order to negotiate later protocols, and to do so considering the priority likely to be
given to national interests. Political and economic national priorities will be inclined to be put forward
first, as has been the case during this pandemic.
3
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We Are One Species
The high-level listening sessions convened by the O’Neill Institute and FNIH identified critical
gaps in global capacities for surveillance, data collection and sharing, communication, coordination, and
response. These gaps overwhelmed governments and those tasked with response and health care at
every level. No country was able to escape the virus.
This upcoming November 29 special session has been called historic—and certainly, the
challenges it seeks to address are historic. To make groundbreaking progress will require imagination
and courage so that the global right to health can be truly realized. As WHO Director-General Tedros
remarked in his opening statement to our consultation:
The pandemic has taught us many lessons. The most
important is that we are one species, sharing one
planet, and we have no future but a shared future.” 7
***
This article does not necessarily reflect the institutional views or positions of the O’Neill Institute or FNIH.
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